Uzay Kiliç
Speaking a language is a part of human behavior, action and of human intentionality, but I claim that ordinary human action cannot be explained by constructing causal explanations based on general laws that can be verified by empirical observation. Because when the methods of the natural sciences are applied to the study of individual and collective human behaviour, they cannot give me satisfactory answers. So, I believe that beliefs, practices, norms, and all values all are related to not objective but kinds of frameworks, contexts and cultural, social circumstances and my main concern here will not be grounded on the issue of the laws of human behavior but various acts of doing, subjective intentions and cultural assumptions and this can only be possible by having the claim that human actions must involve an interpretive not explanatory dimension. In fact, the basic assumption behind my approach to human action is that the criterion of meaning of one's action is just contingent. Since no absolute truth and rationality exist independently of human action, meaning must be prior to any epistemological conception. In this paper, I shall attempt to focus on later Wittgenstein and Austin from the point that the criterion of meaning of human action in both of these philosophers is just internal, contrastive, contingent, and consequently unjustifiable in terms of the issues "ordinary language", "performatives", and the internal connections between intentionality and utterances, practices.
First of all, in the works of both later Wittgenstein and Austin, the concept of the "ordinary" is developed specifically in contrast to what they say as metaphysics. Later Wittgenstein, by dropping the positive (metaphysical) way of speaking, abandons his "picture theory" and the ontological way of thinking related to it in the Tractatus. He is no more seeking for grounds in terms of the notion of "substance" and "fundamental reality", but rather claiming that there are certainly other ways of speaking about "possibilities". While doing this, he says there is no more a need to create a sort of ontology to see a correspondence relation between a word a thing. Moore in his Wittgenstein's Lectures indicates this change in his new mode of thinking very well: "the meaning of a word is no longer for us an object corresponding to it"1. Then, if all explanations do not mean anything to him, there can be no real definition to the concepts we use such as "truth", or "falsity", for there is no "essence" to the world we live in2. In the full sense, I can say that there is no "reality", for us, to get to, and that's why, we cannot speak of a "limit" to either language and experience. In Wittgensteinian sense, we can only talk about the "ordinariness" of language in our "forms of life". He is now looking at the grammar of language from the point of "ordinary language" by pinpointing the role of it in a variety of circumstances within our everyday life.
Similarly, Austin insists on the fact that our fundamental relation to the world is not knowing, which he holds as "descriptive fallacy", and describes the fallacy in the opening sentence of the second paragraph of How to Do Things With Words as follows: "it was too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of "statement" can only be to "describe" some state of affairs, or "state some fact" which it must do either truly or falsely."3 However, it is not easy to distinguish questions, commands from statements just by means of some grammatical rules, so he asks: "How do we decide which is which?", and I add: "What are the limits of definitions of which?" For instance, I could say that the meaning of "this red here" is this, and point to some events in the brain and what I am only doing here is not more than just showing the correlation between the facts and the brain events. Although it seems that there is a causal relationship between objective and the sense impressions collected in the brain, there is always a posibility that this can go wrong, and that's why, I argue that they cannot always tell us how things really are and how the world really is. Therefore, if the meaning were based on only that correlation, a quasi-factual relation, then most specifically, meaning would be contingent, unjustifiable.
In addition to this, in both Wittgenstein and Austin, "ordinary" must be contrasted not with "unusual", "technical" but with "metaphysical" or "metalinguistic" expressions. There are no "super-concepts". As Wittgenstein says, the uses of the word "truth" are just humble as those of the words "lamp", "table", "door"4. Similar to this, the word "being" like the words "knowledge" or "truth" has a variety of uses within our language and none of them is primary and based on some metalinguistic reference. And, each of these words has great value within ordinary language, and beyond ordinary language there is nothing to which they can be referred to. As a result of this, the "criterion" of ordinary, which has a great role in language games and performatives is not a factual criterion; in fact, there are not factual determinants for "ordinary":
"Compare four-dimensional geometry when someone finds time as the fourth. He has not found something new, and can't say "Now I have got it." He has it already in language. It has all the reality it will ever have; it can be connected up with the larger calculi of our language. You can't rest it on any thing; the calculus does not rest on reality."5
As a result of all these, I can say that Wittgenstein is dealing with a sort of "ordinary language philosophy" which rests in "groundlessness, and completely in silence: We try to cover up the beginning of the reasoning; but actually reasoning never started. To say that the earth is not supported similar to saying that language is not supported... "6 Here is a good example of a metaphysical use of words and Wittgenstein's critique of that use:
"one say that 'a', 'b', 'c', etc. signify numbers when for example this removes the mistaken idea that 'a', 'b', 'c', play the part in language actually played by 'block', 'slab', 'pillar'. And one can also say that 'c', means this number and that one, when for example, this serves to explain that the letters are used in the order a, b, c, d, etc. and not in the order a, b, d, c."7
This passage indicates perfectly that a criterion for usage is a sort of contrastive one. A set of marks a, b, c, d, has a meaning as number series if it is seen as playing a role in contrast to a game played by other set of marks. Thus, it becomes evident that language goes holiday and fails to have meaning when this contrastive criterion is violated. In a certain sense, I can say that the metaphysician does not use language at all; in fact, he/she does something with it, but that is not more than just violating the ordinary use of a word in a language in order to get the fundamental base of the meaning of the word.
With respect to this, I can point out that the "ordinary" for both of them is what the absolute scepticism denies. The absolute sceptic cannot be refuted whatever you will tell him/her to be convinced. But I believe that it will be too difficult for him/her to act on the phrases of scepticism for a long period of time. Similar to this, an idealist may question the reality of things, but he/she will still say, for instance, while wishing to get some fresh air, "open the windows, please!", "Could you pass me the salt, please?" Therefore, one may wonder why it is that common, "ordinary" speech works on these matters. It is just evident that language, being dynamic, is a medium of an evolving game and convention, and the relation of language to the world must be considered in a particular and nonmetaphysical context. That's why, I agree with Wittgenstein and Austin in that the traditional philosophy fails in the sense that it has always aimed to get us rid of the importance of ordinary mode of thinking and doing. So, a philosopher who is for ordinary discourse of language will necessarily defend such statements such as "There is a table before me", "This is my hand" against a metaphysician who would claim that such statements are "true" only in terms of the ultimate nature of reality.
Now, I would like to focus on Austin's discovery of speech acts. In How to Things With Words, he says that his theory of speech acts is the presentation of a set of classes- a set in which statements are not "in the business of stating facts truly or falsely." Opening instances, of such (performatives) examples are: "I do", "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother", "I bet you a dollar it will rain tomorrow". Austin comments: "I state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it"8
First of all, Searle categorizes the uttering of words (morphemes, sentence) as the performing of "utterance acts", referring and predicating as the performing of "utterance acts", referring and predicating as the performing of "propositional acts", and stating, questioning, commending, promising, etc., as the performing of "illocutionary acts", a term, as Austin says, in which the language is the act.9 Indeed, being two important element of speech acts, an "illocutionary act" is something we do in performing an "locutionary act" - e.g., informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc.10 In reporting the illocutionary act (he urged, protested, edvised me to do such and such) we convey the force, of the original utterance, the way it is "conventioally" to be taken. Clearly, the illocutionary act is what we are supposed to be performing when we produce a performative. And, a "perlocutionary, is something we may do by producing an illocutionary act" (e.g., persuading, getting somebody to do something, checking somebody, annoying him/her, etc.11
After making all sorts of classifications, Austin draws an important conclusion: "... many senses in which to say something is to do something"12. Indeed, he says: "The name "performative" is derived, of course, from "perform", the usual verb with the noun "action"; it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performance of an action- it is not usually thought of as just saying something."13 Here, it seems to me that "action" in Austin's explanation must be understood to mean doing something rather than saying something true or false. For instance, for a man who makes a promise is certainly considered as saying something ("I promise such - and - such"). The point to be kept in mind here is that what he is saying is not to be taken to have a truth-value: "saying something" has just become "performing a speech act". Here, what is important is that performatives are either fecilitious (happy), or in some other ways infelicitious (unhappy).14 Austin distinguishes between "a happy or - unhappy and a happy sense of illocutionary verbs". In the former we either leave it to open whether the performative was successful or imply that it was not and in the latter we imply that it was. For example, in the happy - or unhappy sense of "warn" I can say that "I warned him by shouting in his ear though he was too deaf to hear", but in the happy sense I can only say that "I tried to warn him by shouting in his ear though I failed because he was too deaf". Therefore, for a speaker's utterance to be warning in the happy - or - unhappy sense what is significant is that it should be "of a kind that he could reasonably expect to secure uptake." And, since I cannot warn a man from a very long distance by whispering a warning, in this sense, he does not actually have to "achieve uptake". When used in their happy senses they must normally supposed to perform an act and also imply the "occurrence of circumstances consquentially".
Moreover, Austin often indicates that the action performed by uttering a performative is "conventional" or "ritual" or "ceremonial". For instance, some cases of conventional acts are bowing shaking hands, cocking a snook, challenging a man to a duel, picking sides in a game. Firstly, here there is a set and prescribed way in which the act in question is supposed to be performed, in other words, "there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a conventional effect"15. More generally, there are a set of understandings, agreements, rules or regulations in which the performer of the act is supposed to satisfy certain demands, acquire certain rights or become subject to certain claims. It can be said that the speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of rules. And, if we turn our attention to meaning, illocutionary acts are characteristically said to have meaning and one is said to mean something by the utterance to have meaning and one is said to mean something by the utterance of some sound or marks. For instance, if I am trying to tell someone something, then as soon as he/she recognizes that I am trying to tell him/her, I can be said to have succeeded in telling it to him/her. On the other hand, unless he/she recognizes that I am trying to tell him/her something, I cannot be said to have fully succeeded in telling it to him/her.
Together with this, of course, here it is worth noting that some of these criteria can vary independently, so we may not have a set of necessarily and sufficient conditions for us to understand which propositional acts and utterance acts one is characteristically performing in performing an illocutionary act. The only point in understanding each of these is "to explicate speech and differentiate the identity criteria of each".16 For example, there are a lot of ways of warning or promising without using a set of formula. When I say, "I warn you that the bull is loose", I may be said to be doing something rather than making a truth claim. But it is also possible to say that I am at least implying contextually a truth claim to the sentence that "the bull is loose". Therefore, as Austin argues truth and falsity seem to be relevant to cases and contrastive in some ways. Even in the case of "I promise that I shall be there" it seems as if there was at least an implied assertion, "I shall be there". So, it is evident that the 'performative' has contrastive aspects of utterances rather than 'exclusive' classes of utterance.
Because of that, the significant discovery of Austin, I believe, is to free the analysis of the performative from the authority of the truth value and to substitute it for the value of force, of difference of force (illocutionary and perlocutionary forces). That is to say that Austin's main aim is to make "performative" get rid of "the value of truth", because there are cases where there is no procedure or no accepted procedure, so there can be no satisfactory choice between alternatives since it is uncertain which is involved in a particular case. Like Austin Wittgenstein emphasizes that we cannot think of "propositions" as a separate class of sentence in language and also, we cannot define any class of sentence in relation to the empirical. In other words, what may seem to be an empirical proposition may turn out to be apriori later, consequently these propositions cannot be a kind of predetermined criteria for meaning because of the priority of the action:
"The limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct: they are ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act."17
"... The end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."18
"As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not preposition: it is not ungrounded way of acting."19
As a result of all these, I can point out that like the character of a language game the performatives suggest us the notion of the contrastive criterion of meaning of action. The framework of that performative (utterance) has a role in giving meaning to an utterance, that is to say that when we understand an utterance, it is because of its not exclusive but internal role. When we understand the meaning, it happens as a result of seeing the way the expressions are related to the possibilities. The ways of doing, acting are based on some pair of words; in other words, by the help of that particular cases where the performative is uttered we can make a distinction between the possibilities, possible experiences within language.
As a challenging illustration, let us now focus on Austin's "excuses" and see how he demonstrates that the consequences, effects, results, etc. of human action all are beyond the justifiable and the explainable. In the opening chapter of that book, How To Do Things With Words, there is a citation from Euripides' Hippolytus and Austin translates this Greek sentence as: "My tongue swore to but my heart did not"20. After a while I will turn back to this sentence. Honestly, the question is: what is the connection of Austin's "excuses" and "insincerities" to the idea or fact of tragedy? Greek tragedy, I believe, is a complex genre and regarding the characteristics of the heroes for instance, I regard it as the possibility to speak about the ungroundlessness of human actions and behaviors and to understand how the criterion of meaning of human doings is so unjustifiable. In a general sense, I would say, a tragedy must be caused by an action performed by its hero, that is called an error and mistake in judgment; on the other hand, the significant point here is that the hero must be at least partially responsible for his catastrophe and must be causally implicated in the course of his reversal. This is important because if you consider a child's death, I can say that its death surely does involve a reversal for both the parents and the child. Still, it is not tragic. The child did nothing to bring about its illness, and so its death is not tragic. However, the hero's "error" is not the sufficient cause of the reversal. The hero is implicated in a world, in a net of causes and effects, that is not completely his own making, because there is a dimension of "necessity" or "fate" in the hero's life. His catastrophe is caused by his involvement in a world beyond his control; in a very precise way, it is this duality that characterizes this tragic catastrophe. To make it much clearer, let us consider Oedipus as an example. He is doomed, fated to kill the man, not knowing that it is his father and marry his mother. This is surely a mistake, not a sin and it leads to the sequence of events that results in this tragedy.
Nevertheless, the key notion here is that the tragedy of Oedipus is the story of a man who is responsible for the most unpredictable action he gets involved with by himself in the final scene and the very challenge of this tragedy is this unpredictability of his own performance that makes me as the audience gets shocked at all: Oedipus destroys his own eyes, but the blind and blooded Oedipus, having discovered who he is, returns to the stage, and significantly, he is still on the stage. He has not been destroyed by the catastrophic tragedy of his understanding of himself and he is still strong enough to make certain demands upon Creon, the new ruler.21 I believe that Oedipus the King, which can be described as a tragedy of knowledge teaches me what I must just acknowledge: life is fundamentally insure and it is not simply riddle to be solved. The world given to us by our parents, the world whose paths we have stepped on for all our lives, cannot be counted certain. This realization is very painful, but it is true. Therefore, I can say that the tragedy ends with a new kind of knowledge: knowledge of ignorance, of limits, in other words, this is the tragic knowledge of limits. Hence, I claim that for the reasons of some patterns of our behaviors, actions we had better not seek for any ground to base them on keeping in mind that they are all far from straight forward solutions, answers and any form of justification.
Now, let me go back to the story of Hippolytus itself. The Greek sentence Austin calls classic and cites from Euripides and translates as "My tongue swore to but my heart did not" is Hippolytus reply to Phaedra's nurse when she reminds of him his promise to keep her revelation as a secret. However, Hippolytus causes the tragedy of his stepmother Phaedra by his inhability to break his promise to the nurse not to tell that he knows Phaedra's passion for him.
Here, one might say that Phaedra's inhability to keep her passion to herself at the first sight suggests calling this play also a tragedy of expressiveness; however, in reading Austin I take him more as proposing a sort of solution to the "unassurance of the speech" and inviting us to see the tragic featues of our utterances. He says, as quoted: "Morality and accuracy alike on the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond.". Therefore, by placing the expression, "nevertheless I am bound" next to that Greek line although Hippolytus never utters it so, Austin must be saying that some utterances of us may be just irretrievable: "My tongue swore - nevertheless I am bound." I guess what Austin wants to indicate that saying something is not exactly or quite doing something. Here, excuses are essentially implicated in Austin's view of human action as slips, that is to say that human action can be performed "unintentionally, unwillingly, involuntarily, sincerely, unthinkingly, carelessly, heedlessly, under duress, under the influence, out of contempt, out of pity, by mistake, by accident, etc.". Honestly, one thing is so obvious that excuses are caused by unending vulnerable human actions and by the preoccupation of the mind itself and as a result, there is no significant internal and external features common to mental states of the same kind. As Wittgenstein pinpoints, mental life should be taken into consideration together with the external context of cultural and social norms and practices. Then, it is a very inevitable fact that not only the context of one's mental life but also one's being captured in one situation plays an important role in one's being able to realize his/her intentions, desires, expectations and shortcomings.
Therefore, I realize that there is a relation betwen one's intentionality and causality, for an intention represents an action to be caused by this action22, but what causes intentional states act causally? Here, I claim that there is an internal relation between the cause and effect themselves, since in every case of intentional content that issue is related to its conditions of satisfaction. For example, suppose that I am thirsty and I drink a glass of water. If someone asks me why I drank it, I know the answer without any need of observation or description: I was just thirsty. I know that if I had not been thirsty then I might not have drunk that glass of water, or I must question whether it was part of the fact of some universal law? I do not believe so. The second time I might or might not drink a glass of water and that is not predestined by anyone or anything. It is entirely up to me.
Thus, I am not commited to any predetermined existing causal laws and human action cannot be grounded on some causal explanations, based on empirical observation and general laws. Besides, being thirsty, in spite of how described, contains a desire to drink and that desire has a conditions of my satisfaction, that I drink. Thus, to indicate the point once more, I insist on the fact that my thirst caused me to drink does not entail that there is a universal law putting the sequence of events under some descriptions. In fact, intentional causation is what I directly experience in many cases where I make something happen23. When, for example, I raise my arm, the main content of my experience is that my intentionality is what makes my arm go up. I do not need any logo-centric explanation which will make me say that when I raised my arm, some external force will cause my arm to go up, and I directly experienced the causing. Thus, the notion of causation is not in the descriptions or observations of actions but it is in the performance of actions themselves.
In addition to this, I would like to focus on the problem of intentionality deeper. This matter, as I indicated above, has got nothing to do with the problem of explaining why sentences about intentional mental phenomena violate certain logical principles. Rather, it is the problem of explaining why these intentional mental phenomena relate to the state of affairs they are about. As Searle indicates, mental states are not intentional because of any objective relations between them and extra-mental reality. Mental states are intentional because they 'intristically, have representational properties24. There is no need to think how they are related to something else, rather they should be understood just by their own internal character. So, I am committed to the view that intentionality can only be understood by holding an "internalist" approach to it. At this point, I am inclined to support the ideas of Searle and I also claim that the intentionality of a mental state is independent of what is indeed true about extra-mental reality. Like Wittgenstein, Searle believes, in particular, that the notion of intentionality does not appeal to any entities especially any kind of abstract entities25 . What he just insists is that mental states have conditions of satisfaction and so are representational. First, aches or some cases of anxiety are not intentional; whereas, belief, hope, expectation or desire are. Why? Because, they must specify what it is about important to that not all mental states are intentional states, only those which require the specification of an intentional object are intentional26. For instance, If x believes that it is snowing out, then the intentional object of his/her belief is the state of affairs in the actual world that it is just snowing out.
Similarly, Wittgenstein's approach to intentionality is something non-ontological. If one finds himself/herself dissatisfied with this claim, it points out that he/she has a mistaken understanding of intentionality according to Wittgenstein. Because, it would mean that he/she is still searching a thing corresponding to the word "intention" but the only thing to know what an intention is: First, what are its conditions of satisfaction; second, under what aspects are those conditions represented by the intentional content; and third, what is the psychological mode-belief, desire, intention, etc. - of the state in question. And, to know the second of these is already to know the first, since conditions of satisfaction are always represented under certain aspects. Because of this we do not need to know its ultimate ontological statue at all. To call something an intentional object is just to say that it is what some intentional state is about. Thus, for example, if George admires John, then the intentional object of his admiration is John, the actual man himself and not some sort of entity between George and the man, John. In both cases of speech acts and intentional states, if there is an object that satisfies the propositional or the representational content, the speech acts and the intentional state cannot be satisfied. Thus, for instance, the statement that the King of France is bald cannot be true for there is no King of France, and similarly, the belief that King of France is bald cannot be true, because there is no King of France. In such cases, there is no "intentional object" of the intentional state and no "referred - to object" of the statement and as I have mentioned above, because of the reference failure our statements may fail to be true. But this fact should not suggest us to suppose that we must find out an entity for such statements to do not assert that your toe has been stepped on or I try to get your toe stepped on be about. We realize that they have a propositional content which nothing statisfies, and in that sentence, they are not "about", anything. Also, in exactly the same way Wittgenstein is suggesting that we should not seek for 'an intermediate entity' for our intentional states to be about when they fail to be satisfied. Therefore, I can remark that an intentional state has a representative content, but it is not directed at its representative content27.
Now, on the related issue, for a significant connection between intentional states and speech acts, it must be indicated that the intentional states really vary in "direction of fit" according to their psychological mode.28 Searle says that beliefs and perceptions, for instance, have the mind - world direction of fit, because if my belief is mistaken, it is the belief not the world that is at fault. Whereas, intentions and desires have the world - to - mind direction of fit for if my desire is unfulfilled, it is the world and the desire which is at fault. From all these, it is quite easy to put forvard that apologies, thanks, and congratulations cannot have any direction of fit because in their performance the speaker takes for granted that the propositional content is already satisfied. For example, when I apologize for stepping on your toe, I presuppose that it has been stepped on or I must just believe that I did in fact step on your toe to be sorry for stepping on your toe. As a result, I pinpoint that the conditions of satisfaction of speech acts are closely paralleled by the conditions of satisfaction of intentional states.
Let us apply this to some other sorts of speech acts from the perspective of Austin. For instance, in the case of an order, the order is obeyed only if the act that the hearer is ordered to perform is carried out by way of ordering the order and in the case of a promise, the promise is kept only if the action promised is done by the way of fulfilling the promise. I might say "Well, I was going to leave the room anyhow, but I wouldn't do it because you ordered me to do". Have I obeyed the order if I then leave the room? I certainly haven't disobeyed it, but in the full sense, I could not say that I had obeyed it, either. So, what such examples are designed to display, for the present discussion here, is that, in addition to "self - referentional character of all intentions", the intention to make a promise or an order must impose an additional "self - referentional condition of satisfaction on the utterance". Promises and orders are self - referentional because thein conditions of satisfaction make reference to the promises or orders themselves. In the full sense one only keeps a promise or obeys an order if one does by the way of keeping the promise or obeying the order. Therefore, what this example illustrates is that the content of my order is not simply that you leave the room, but that you leave the room by way of obeying "this order"; that is, the logical form of the order is not simply: I order you (that you leave the room) but rather it is causally self - referentional in the form: I order you (that you leave the room by way of obeying this order). Another way to emphasize the same issue is that promises and orders create reasons for the conditions of satisfaction in a way which is quite unlike statements. Because making a statement by itself does not create evidence for the truth of statements; however making a promise does create a reason for doing the thing promised, and asking someone to do something creates a reason or his/her doing it.29
To sum up, in this paper I have aimed to discuss the unjustifiable, internal, contrastive criterion of meaning in later Wittgenstein and Austin, and in order to make clear what the nature of that sort of criterion is, and in what sense it is held as a criterion, I have first concentrated on the notion of "ordinary", "ordinary mode of thinking" as opposed to the metaphysical mode of thinking, and then the notions of "peformatives" in Austin and "intentionality" especially in Searle and Wittgenstein. By referring to some quotations and two Greek tragedies as illustrations I have come to the conclusion that meaning cannot be presupposed or predetermined; therefore, in a language, our purpose must be no more to achieve a sort of factual truth or falsity, but rather the unjustifiability of the meaning of our actions. Furthermore, since that unjustifiability or "ungroundlessness" of language (a Wittgensteinian term), does not have any external, empirical, observational bases, it leads us to live a variety of possibilities within our language and become aware of the fact that meaning depends on internal, opposite and contextual relation betwen the words, terms, utterances, and performatives, and also, of the fact that the intentonality of mental states is internal, "intristic" to the states themselves because our intentionality must be understood in the very structure of human action itself, not in the description of human action.
1Moore, G. E., Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933 in Philosophical Papers, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 261.
2Ibid., p. 110.
3Austin, J. L., How To Do Things With Words, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 1.
4Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, trans., Anscombe, G.E.M., New York: Mcmillan, 1953, p. 97.
5Moore, G. E., Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933 in Philosophical Papers, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 103.
6Ibid., p. 104.
7Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, trans., Anscombe, G.E.M., New York: Mcmillan, 1953, p. 6.
8Austin, J. L., How To Do Things With Words, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 5-6.
9Searle John R., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1969, p. 181.
10Austin, J. L., How To Do Things With Words, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 108.
11Ibid., p. 101-102.
12Ibid., pp. 94.
13Ibid., p. 6-7.
14Ibid., p. 433.
15Ibid., p. 14.
16Searl, John R., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1969, p. 87.
17Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Basil Balckwell, 1956, p. 176.
18Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, trans., Anscombe, G.E.M., New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 205.
19Ibid., p. 110.
20Austin, J. L., How To Do Things With Words, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 9-10.
21Dave, R.D., Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 1436-1469.
22Searle, John R., Intentionality, USA: Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1983, p. 228.
23Ibid., p. 244.
24McIntyre, Ronald, Searle on Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, Language, London, 1981, p. 472.
25Ibid., p. 68.
26Searle, John R., Intentionality, USA: Cambridge: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1983, p. 228.
27Ibid., p. 96.
28Ibid., p. 116.
29Ibid., p. 170.