https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/issue/feed
Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy
2025-06-19T08:57:53+02:00
Radim Bělohrad
profil@phil.muni.cz
Open Journal Systems
<p><em>Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy </em>is a peer-reviewed scientific journal that publishes articles addressing a whole range of philosophical topics as well as contributions from natural sciences focusing on philosophically relevant issues. We welcome original research papers, review essays, book reviews, and polemics, preferably in English.</p>
https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/40716
Keith J. Holyoak – The Human Edge: Analogy and the Roots of Creative Intelligence
2025-04-14T20:49:14+02:00
Tereza Matějková
matejkot@ff.zcu.cz
<p>Book Review</p>
2025-06-19T00:00:00+02:00
Copyright © 2025 Tereza Matějková
https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/40717
Moralizing Beauty – Some Critical Observations
2025-04-14T21:57:47+02:00
Per Bauhn
Per.Bauhn@Lnu.se
<p>In this paper, I intend to criticize an argument, made by the philosopher Panos Paris, claiming that moral goodness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of beauty. I will argue that Paris’s idea of functional beauty, on which his argument relies, does not work, as it misrepresents judgements of beauty, in fact reducing them to moral judgements. I will argue that judgements of beauty and moral judgements should be understood as distinct and independent of each other. That is, the morally good is not necessarily beautiful, and the beautiful is not necessarily morally good.</p>
2025-06-19T00:00:00+02:00
Copyright © 2025 Per Bauhn
https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/40528
A Critique of Metaethical Constructivism
2025-03-18T20:13:03+01:00
Adam Greif
adam.greif@uniba.sk
<p>Metaethical constructivism, proposed by Sharon Street, has been described as a novel and promising metaethical theory. It is a form of cognitivist anti-realism that purports to be without substantive normative assumptions, while still allowing for the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them. Here, I present five objections to the theory’s purported strengths. I argue primarily that metaethical constructivism cannot do without substantive normative assumptions, that it is not a novel position in metaethics but a kind of relativism, and that the possibility of an agent being mistaken about what is normatively true for them is more limited than it might seem. I also argue that constructivism does not allow us to evaluate distant pasts and futures, and that it blurs the line between normative truth and falsity.</p>
2025-06-19T00:00:00+02:00
Copyright © 2025 Adam Greif
https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/40436
The King and Ace Puzzle: A Proposal of Solution from a Term Logic
2025-03-31T16:08:46+02:00
Miguel López-Astorga
milopez@utalca.cl
<p>What I call the ‘king and ace puzzle’ here is an inference whose correct conclusion is hard to infer for people. There are reasoning theories offering explanations about this fact, including relevant frameworks such as the mental logic theory and the theory of mental models. In this paper, I claim that a term logic such as Inheritance Logic can also give us its account of that cognitive phenomenon. The key is the assumption of an equivalence: conditionals can be deemed as inheritance copulas.</p>
2025-06-19T00:00:00+02:00
Copyright © 2025 Miguel López-Astorga