Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil <p><em>Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy </em>is a peer-reviewed scientific journal that publishes articles addressing a whole range of philosophical topics as well as contributions from natural sciences focusing on philosophically relevant issues. We welcome original research papers, review essays, book reviews, and polemics, preferably in English.</p> Masaryk University en-US Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy 1212-9097 Andy Clark – The Experience Machine: How Our Minds Predict and Shape Reality https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/41647 <p>Book Review</p> Vojtěch Polívka Copyright © 2025 Vojtěch Polívka http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 66–68 66–68 10.5817/pf25-2-41647 The Consequentialist Judgment Paradox https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/41693 <p>In normative ethics, some of the oldest and still lively debates revolve around the question of consequentialism. The question is not so much about making a binary decision between consequentialism and its alternatives (notably deontology). Contemporary discussions agree that consequentialism does not work alone and that only compromises between consequentialism and other views might be considered as plausible moral theories. This paper aims to present a novel argument, which encompasses a general and logical critique of any system that bases its judgments on consequences. Indeed, it seems that no matter how we try, every judgment based on the consequences of actions seems to be prone to logical contradiction. However, the argument is limited in the sense that it does not encompass the case where consequentialist theories are used by entities that are not moral agents. Indeed, if an entity judges actions while being causally separated from the world in which those actions occur, then the paradox doesn't occur. This limit doesn't make the argument irrelevant, since ethical judgments are exclusively made by moral agents themselves, like humans. Thus, the argument also favors positions that admit significant limits to the truth that we grant to moral propositions.</p> Arthur Ionescu Copyright © 2025 Arthur IONESCU http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 1–15 1–15 10.5817/pf25-2-41693 Reflexive Freedom and The Politics of Participation https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/41711 <p>The article presents a theoretical-methodological analysis of the concept of reflexive freedom in relation to the political sphere of its application, with the aim of revealing and clarifying the main political consequences and normative claims that its recognition implies for political theory. The analysis is based on the assumption that particular conceptions of individual freedom as moral autonomy of the individual lead to particular models of politics. In the article, the main thesis is formulated and argued that the philosophical conception of reflexive freedom, in its applicability, programmatically leads to a model of participatory politics. As part of the analysis, the concept of reflexive freedom is compared with the competing concept of negative freedom and its corresponding model of politics, the politics of modus vivendi. The comparison makes it possible to highlight several specificities and particularities of reflexive freedom and politics of participation and, thus, reveal a diametrically different perspective on the phenomenon of individual freedom and the political conditions for its assurance.</p> Ciprian Turčan Copyright © 2025 Ciprian Turčan http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 16–29 16–29 10.5817/pf25-2-41711 Love as a Virtue and Care as Its Aspect: The View of Philippa Foot https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/41914 <p>This paper argues that love is a genuine virtue and that its most important aspect is care. We examine this concept through the lens of Philippa Foot’s ethical naturalism, which grounds morality in objective facts about a species’ “life form.” This framework positions love not as a mere emotion, but as a learned disposition of the rational will that integrates both cognitive and emotional elements. We leverage the rigorous neo-Aristotelian analysis of R. Halwani, who demonstrates that care fully satisfies the two necessary criteria for being a cardinal virtue: it is defined as a reasoned disposition to feel a cluster of appropriate emotions and is indispensable for human flourishing. By interpreting love as an active disposition of care—concerned with helping living beings to flourish—this paper demonstrates how this virtue serves as a foundation for a flourishing, interdependent human life, both as recipients and givers of care. This robust view provides a strong defense against cynical reductionist views like Nietzsche’s immoralism, showing that love, anchored in rational character traits like care, is a practical and essential component of a good life.</p> Michal Chabada Copyright © 2025 Michal Chabada http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 30–42 30–42 10.5817/pf25-2-41914 Political Thought in the Planetary Situation of the Anthropocene https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42180 <p>The subject of this study is an investigation into the possibility of establishing a new mode of political thought (political theory) under the conditions of the Anthropocene. The basic principle at play is that the typical civilizational thought of the Western (Atlantic) culture – as embodied in technology – is creating a worldwide situation with no simple avenues for escape. The Westerner has turned his thoughts and reason away from a wisdom leading to harmony, but instead towards deconstruction and destruction, a devastation whose consequences will be a slow, painful, but unavoidable annihilation. This single form of human rationality is responsible for the pillaging of the natural and social environment; it is a form painstakingly protected, privileged and nurtured from the start of European modernism. Capitalism’s economic, technological and demographic growth has had unintended ecological and civilisational consequences with catastrophic cumulative effects on the environment.</p> Břetislav Horyna Copyright © 2025 Břetislav Horyna http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 43–52 43–52 10.5817/pf25-2-42180 Human-Conceptual Morality and the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Virtue-Ethical Approach https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42095 <p>This paper examines the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics by exploring its different forms. Advocating a mind-dependent interpretation, it builds on the naturalistic virtue ethics of Philippa Foot. By proposing several modifications to Foot’s theory—incorporating insights from contemporary biology and synthesizing naturalistic and constructivist approaches—the paper argues that while certain parts of non-human nature may possess intrinsic value based on natural teleology, the evaluative process is exclusively human-centred. This claim becomes even more evident in the transition from intrinsic to moral value. Ultimately, the paper suggests that moral consideration of the environment depends less on adherence to norms and more on the moral character and motivation of the acting agent.</p> Roman Hloch Copyright © 2025 Roman Hloch http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2025-12-12 2025-12-12 26 2 53–65 53–65 10.5817/pf25-2-42095