Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil <p><em>Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy </em>is a peer-reviewed scientific journal that publishes articles addressing a whole range of philosophical topics as well as contributions from natural sciences focusing on philosophically relevant issues. We welcome original research papers, review essays, book reviews, and polemics, preferably in English.</p> en-US profil@phil.muni.cz (Radim Bělohrad) profil@phil.muni.cz (Pro-Fil) Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:57:37 +0200 OJS 3.2.1.4 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Marius Baumann – The Underdetermination of Moral Theories https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42713 <p>Book Review</p> Jakub Kyška Copyright © 2026 Jakub Kyška http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42713 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200 Vanessa de Harven – The Unity of Stoic Metaphysics: Everything Is Something https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42672 <p>Book Review</p> Lenka Ambrožová Copyright © 2026 Lenka Ambrožová http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42672 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200 Lauren Tilton, David Mimno, Jessica Marie Johnson, Eds. – Computational Humanities: Debates in the Digital Humanities. https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43107 <p>Book review</p> Jan Tvrz Copyright © 2026 Jan Tvrz http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43107 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200 Counting Years of Life: Some Reflections on Numbers Skepticism https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43894 <p>In this paper, I discuss John Taurek’s (1977) famous attempt to undermine the moral significance of numbers in situations in which one is expected to choose whom to save from harm. Taurek famously argued that the number of people affected by one’s choice should not be a morally relevant factor in determining how one should act in conflict cases. While Taurek’s approach has obvious counterintuitive implications, I suggest that one way to avoid them while still preserving the spirit of his argument is to focus on the number of years a person is expected to live.</p> Matej Sušnik Copyright © 2026 Matej Sušnik http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43894 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200 The Problem of Demarcation: Essentialist and Constructivist Perspectives https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43079 <p>This paper examines the problem of demarcation in contemporary philosophy of science, with particular emphasis on the transition from essentialist to constructivist approaches. Traditional accounts aimed to establish universal and necessary criteria distinguishing science from non-science; however, such efforts have proven unsuccessful and have been widely criticized. The paper argues that this failure does not justify abandoning the demarcation project, but rather calls for its reconceptualization. Drawing on insights from science and technology studies and feminist epistemology, demarcation is approached as a context-sensitive and practice-based process. It is conceptualized as a form of boundary-work enacted within scientific institutions and communities. The analysis highlights the procedural, socially negotiated, and normatively significant character of demarcation, thereby contributing to a broader understanding of scientificity.</p> Mariana Szapuová Copyright © 2026 Mariana Szapuová http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/43079 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200 How to Be a Metaphysically Free Agent https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42102 <p>The thesis of universal causal determinism implies we are but conscious automata whose every interaction with the world follows a tight script that cannot be deviated from. This is a disconcerting implication as it undermines the image of ourselves as agents in charge of our lives. Is any committed determinist to put up with this deflated image of herself? In this paper, I open a new conceptual perspective on this disconcerting implication that will reinflate the image. I will show in what sense we can be seen as metaphysically free despite the truth of the thesis of universal causal determinism. The new perspective is compatibilist in essence and meant to be therapeutically attractive.</p> Ivo Dragoun Copyright © 2026 Ivo Dragoun http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42102 Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200