Austin and Quine on the Dogmas
Vol.17,No.1(2016)
analytic; a priori; Austin; Quine; reductionism; synthetic
Austin, J. L. (1961a): “Are There A Priori Concepts?” In Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, 32–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, J. L. (1961b): “The Meaning of a Word.” In Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, 55–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, J. L. (1962): Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ayer, A. J. (1969): “Has Austin Refuted Sense-Data?” In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 284–308. London: Routledge.
Berlin, I. (1973): “Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy.” In Berlin et al.: Essays on J. L. Austin, 1–16. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1961): “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In Quine, W. V. O.: From a Logical Point of View, 20–46. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969): “II. W. V. O. Quine.” In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 86–90. London: Routledge.
Tomeček, M. (2006): “Pohlcení sémantiky pragmatikou.” In Zouhar, M.: Jazyk z pohľadu sémantiky, pragmatiky a filozofie vedy, 33-7. Bratislava: Filozofický ústav SAV.
Tomeček, M. (2010): “Jméno ve spise O jistotě.” In Ludmila Dostálová, Radek Schuster: Studie k filosofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina, 197-205. Prague: Filosofia.
Urmson, J. O. (1969): “I. J. O. Urmson.” In Fann, K. T.: Symposium on J. L. Austin, 76–86. London: Routledge.
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