The Role of Habit and Automation in Moral Character

In my article, as a part of an attempt to update Aristotle’s classic concept of moral character, I address the concept of habit and the issue of automation of mental processes. I argue that the concept of virtue as a habit, understood as a routine and automated activity in which we are unable to present actual reasons for our actions, is not consistent with the classical theory of Aristotle. My argument is based on an analysis of the term ‘deliberate choice’ (proairésis) and I present Bill Pollard and Matt Stichter as the proponents of the criticized direction. However, I dedicate most of the paper to the philosopher Nancy Snow and her complex concept of virtue, in which she, among other things, follows the conception of Pollard, and which she connects with the notion of moral expertise. Here I make an objection and argue that her rejection of the justification for an action as a condition of a virtuous action is not a satisfactory update of the classical concept of moral character, i.e., it is not a suitable development or an adequate revision of the concept. On the basis of psychological research of expertise, we can present equally good reasons why it is possible and desirable for a moral expert to be able to justify his actions.