The Consequentialist Judgment Paradox

In normative ethics, some of the oldest and still lively debates revolve around the question of consequentialism. The question is not so much about making a binary decision between consequentialism and its alternatives (notably deontology). Contemporary discussions agree that consequentialism does not work alone and that only compromises between consequentialism and other views might be considered as plausible moral theories. This paper aims to present a novel argument, which encompasses a general and logical critique of any system that bases its judgments on consequences. Indeed, it seems that no matter how we try, every judgment based on the consequences of actions seems to be prone to logical contradiction. However, the argument is limited in the sense that it does not encompass the case where consequentialist theories are used by entities that are not moral agents. Indeed, if an entity judges actions while being causally separated from the world in which those actions occur, then the paradox doesn't occur. This limit doesn't make the argument irrelevant, since ethical judgments are exclusively made by moral agents themselves, like humans. Thus, the argument also favors positions that admit significant limits to the truth that we grant to moral propositions.