Love as a Virtue and Care as Its Aspect: The View of Philippa Foot
Vol.26,No.2(2025)
This paper argues that love is a genuine virtue and that its most important aspect is care. We examine this concept through the lens of Philippa Foot’s ethical naturalism, which grounds morality in objective facts about a species’ “life form.” This framework positions love not as a mere emotion, but as a learned disposition of the rational will that integrates both cognitive and emotional elements. We leverage the rigorous neo-Aristotelian analysis of R. Halwani, who demonstrates that care fully satisfies the two necessary criteria for being a cardinal virtue: it is defined as a reasoned disposition to feel a cluster of appropriate emotions and is indispensable for human flourishing. By interpreting love as an active disposition of care—concerned with helping living beings to flourish—this paper demonstrates how this virtue serves as a foundation for a flourishing, interdependent human life, both as recipients and givers of care. This robust view provides a strong defense against cynical reductionist views like Nietzsche’s immoralism, showing that love, anchored in rational character traits like care, is a practical and essential component of a good life.
virtue ethics; P. Foot; ethical naturalism; love; care; human flourishing; R. Halwani
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