Human-Conceptual Morality and the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Virtue-Ethical Approach
Vol.26,No.2(2025)
This paper examines the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics by exploring its different forms. Advocating a mind-dependent interpretation, it builds on the naturalistic virtue ethics of Philippa Foot. By proposing several modifications to Foot’s theory—incorporating insights from contemporary biology and synthesizing naturalistic and constructivist approaches—the paper argues that while certain parts of non-human nature may possess intrinsic value based on natural teleology, the evaluative process is exclusively human-centred. This claim becomes even more evident in the transition from intrinsic to moral value. Ultimately, the paper suggests that moral consideration of the environment depends less on adherence to norms and more on the moral character and motivation of the acting agent.
environmental ethics; intrinsic value; virtue ethics; naturalism; constructivism
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