How to Be a Metaphysically Free Agent
Vol.27,No.1(2026)
The thesis of universal causal determinism implies we are but conscious automata whose every interaction with the world follows a tight script that cannot be deviated from. This is a disconcerting implication as it undermines the image of ourselves as agents in charge of our lives. Is any committed determinist to put up with this deflated image of herself? In this paper, I open a new conceptual perspective on this disconcerting implication that will reinflate the image. I will show in what sense we can be seen as metaphysically free despite the truth of the thesis of universal causal determinism. The new perspective is compatibilist in essence and meant to be therapeutically attractive.
causal determinism; compatibilism; metaphysical freedom; reasons-responsiveness
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