The Problem of Demarcation: Essentialist and Constructivist Perspectives
Vol.27,No.1(2026)
This paper examines the problem of demarcation in contemporary philosophy of science, with particular emphasis on the transition from essentialist to constructivist approaches. Traditional accounts aimed to establish universal and necessary criteria distinguishing science from non-science; however, such efforts have proven unsuccessful and have been widely criticized. The paper argues that this failure does not justify abandoning the demarcation project, but rather calls for its reconceptualization. Drawing on insights from science and technology studies and feminist epistemology, demarcation is approached as a context-sensitive and practice-based process. It is conceptualized as a form of boundary-work enacted within scientific institutions and communities. The analysis highlights the procedural, socially negotiated, and normatively significant character of demarcation, thereby contributing to a broader understanding of scientificity.
demarcation problem; constructivist approaches; scientific practice; feminist analysis of science
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