From two worlds to two concepts of nature – notes on Kant's Critique of teleological judgment

The author analyzes Kant's Critique of Judgment and the concept of judgment and comes to the conclusion that nature in Kant's work cannot only be understood as the empirical world (the world of phenomena), but that the empirical world must be taken as a specification of active (creative) nature including both sensory and non-empirical world. It is only that concept of nature which presents us with examples of conduct, which, being examples uniting chance and necessity, lead beyond the sensory world. It is only that concept of nature that can accommodate man. The two worlds – the empirical world of the Critique of Pure Reason and the completely different intelligible world of the Critique of Practical Reason unite in the necessary concept of "one nature". One specification of the united nature is the world of phenomena in space and time, including the concept of chance; another specification is the imperative moral law, which is the basis of the knowledge of man's freedom as part of extra-sensory nature.