Induction in the philosophy of science
Vol.62,No.2(2015)
Abstract
Keywords:
induction; philosophy of science; bayesianism
Pages:
55–63
The article deals with the problem of induction in the philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to present the problem of induction, types of induction, which are reliable in science and to point out that the problem of induction is not just a problem of scientific realism, but it also strikes the Bayesian theory. The central attention is paid to the discussion if subjective probability account could help with problematic nature of induction and if justification of induction is really a deal. The paper concludes by claiming that even though no Bayesian thesis allowed us to think that probability is a solution to Hume’s problem of induction and there are several attempts in history to dismiss the problem, the history of science is connected with inductive inferences and the problem of justifying induction remains for philosophy of science.
induction; philosophy of science; bayesianism
55–63