Function as a criterion for updating the Aristotle's concept of moral character

The article falls into the thematic area of contemporary efforts to revive Aristotle's ethical theory. In a narrower demarcation, I am concerned with the topic of updating the concept of moral character (or moral virtue), which is associated with a findings of knowledge of psychological sciences. Here I pay key attention to the problem of the criteria according to which we can assess the adequacy of proposals for such an update. In addition to the commonly respected criteria of interdisciplinarity and empirical and normative adequacy, I present the criterion of function, which is the central concept of the article. The aim of the article is to formulate this criterion and, for its further clarification, to capture the function (simply put, usefulness or contribution) of Aristotle's ethical theory. Furthermore, it is my intention to use examples to present consequences of adopting this criterion (i.e. maintaining or increasing function) for assessing to adequacy of proposals to update Aristotle's concept of moral character. I consider the increase in our moral literacy to be the function of Aristotle's ethical theory, and I argue that this function stems from the key feature of Aristotle's work, rigorous analysis, and the interrelationships between the concepts we associate with everyday morality and living a good and contented life. Using specific examples, I show how efforts to meet other criteria for adequate updating can lead to a conceptual reduction, an overload of irrelevant information, or otherwise collide with the criterion of function. I illustrate the fulfillment of all the criteria presented here as the skill analogy presented by Julia Annas as an update.